Abstract. We use generating functional analysis to study minority-game type market models with generalized strategy valuation updates that control the psychology of agents' actions. The agents' choice between trend following and contrarian trading, and their vigor in each, depends on the overall state of the market. Even in 'fake history' models, the theory now involves an effective overall bid process (coupled to the effective agent process) which can exhibit profound remanence effects and new phase transitions. For some models the bid process can be solved directly, others require Maxwell-construction type approximations.
Introduction
Minority games (MG) [1, 2] are simple models proposed about a decade ago to understand the origin of the cooperative phenomena and nontrivial fluctuations observed in financial markets, on the basis of so-called inductive decision making by imperfect interacting agents [3] . With the recent exposure of the inadequacy of classical economic modeling that assumes full rationality, intelligence and honesty of market players and evolution to an efficient stable market, the case for the alternative MG approach to market models is probably beyond discussion. The further strength of MG-type models is that they can be solved analytically; especially the generating functional analysis (GFA) method has proven to be an effective tool in this field [4, 5, 6] . We refer to the recent textbooks [7, 8] for historical backgrounds, the connection between MGs and markets, details on mathematical methods, and full references.
Standard MG models are now understood reasonably well, so the next task is to generalize the mathematical technology developed so as to apply to models that are more realistic economically. In this paper we try to contribute to this aim, by studying analytically MG-type models in which we generalize the agents' strategy valuation rules: the strategy type to be rewarded (and by how much) depends on the overall market bid A. Agents can switch from a contrarian to a trend-following strategy, and adjust their level of caution, on the basis of how anomalous they perceive the market to be. Such ingredients are incorporated easily into the fabric of MG-type models, by enhancing the valuation update with a function F [A] of the excess demand; the question is how to decide which agent behaviour should be encoded in this function, and how to solve mathematically the resulting GFA equations.
By changing the magnitude of the valuation updates in the MG in an A-dependent way, we can model a preference of agents (who remain contrarians) for profitable decisions with large excess demand/supply (high-risk high-gain behaviour), or model the opposite situation where they prefer small excess demand/supply (low-risk low-gain behaviour). If we also allow agents to switch to trend-following, there are two possible routes. One could argue that when markets are booming, equity prices tend to rise slowly and the trading volume increases (so agents are trend-followers, as in the majority game [10] ), until the magnitude |A| of the overall market bid becomes too large, leading to turmoil and contrarian behaviour. This was the view of [11, 12] . Alternatively, one could argue that for small |A| the market would be regarded as normal, and agents would seek advantage by contrarian trading, whereas large |A| would be regarded as anomalous, prompting panic-driven trend-following.
In this paper we first develop the theory for MG-type models with arbitrary valuation update functions F [A]. Then we focus on the above three agent behaviour scenarios: a model of strict contrarians with controlled degrees of caution versus greed, one where nonvolatile markets are interpreted as risk free and prompt trend-following (agents only become contrarians under volatile conditions), and one where in non-volatile markets agents are contrarians (switching to panic-driven trend-following under volatile conditions). Although the latter two cases are mathematically similar, they lead to qualitatively different solutions. We will find that certain regions of the phase diagram are characterized by prominent remanence effects, with multiple locally stable states, prompting us to rely on approximations of the Maxwell-construction type. As a result, whereas our predictions are confirmed satisfactorily by numerical simulations in non-remanent cases, when there is remanence, there remain deviations and gaps in our understanding which will require further investigation.
Definitions
Let there to be N agents in the game, labeled by i ∈ {1, . . . , N }, where N is odd. The game proceeds at discrete steps t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. At every step t each agent takes a binary decision bi(t) ∈ {−1, 1}, the 'bid', representing e.g. buying (−1) versus selling (+1). A re-scaled aggregate overall bid at step t is defined as A(t) = N
bi(t) + Ae(t), where Ae(t) is an external contribution, representing perturbations, the impact of large market operators, or the action of regulators. At each step, the agents are provided with external information, which in fake history MGs is a random number µ(t) ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Each agent i has two strategies Ria, with a = 1, 2, with which to map each µ to a trading action: R ia : {1, . . . , p} → {−1, 1}
A strategy functions as a lookup-table with p entries, all of which are drawn independently at random from {−1, 1} (with equal probabilities) before the start of the game. If agent i uses strategy a at step t, then he will act (deterministically) according to bi(t) = R µ(t)
ia . In the standard MG an agent makes profit if he finds himself in the minority, i.e. if A(t)bi(t) < 0. Each agent monitors the performance of his two strategies (irrespective of whether they were used), by measuring the so-called valuations pia(t), defined via pia(t + 1) = pia(t) −ηA(t) R µ(t) ia . Hereη > 0 denotes a 'learning rate'. At each step t of the game, each agent i will select his best strategy ai(t) at that stage of the process, defined as ai(t) = arg max a∈{1,2} {pia(t)}. Agents thus behave as 'contrarians'. Here we generalize this rule in the spirit of [11] , to incorporate the possibility that whether agents behave as contrarians or trend-followers may depend dynamically on whether they perceive the market state A(t) to be close to or far from its 'natural' value: pia(t+1) = pia(t)−ηR (1)
We switch in the usual manner to new variables qi(t) = 
One obtains the standard batch MG for F [A] = A, and a batch majority game for
We will develop the theory initially for arbitrary F [A], but focus ultimately on the choices
with τ = ±1 and A0 > 0. In the second formula, for τ = −1 the agents behave as a trendfollowers (majority game play) when |A| < A0, but switch to contrarians (minority game play) for |A| > A0; this is the model of [11, 12] . For τ = 1 the situation is reversed. We will write averaging over the stochastic process (3) as . . . . The global bid fluctuations in the system are characterized by the volatility matrix Ξ tt ′ :
From this follows the conventional market volatility σ via σ 2 = limτ→∞ τ
Ξtt.
Generating functional analysis
The appropriate moment generating functional for a stochastic process of the type (3), given that now we will be interested also in overall bid statistics, is
with Aµ(t) as defined in (4). For (7) to be well defined, we specify an upper time limit tmax. Taking suitable derivatives of the (7) with respect to the variables {ψi(t), φµ(t)} generates all moments of the random variables {σ[qi(t), zi(t)]} and {Aµ(t)}, at arbitrary times, e.g.
Averaging (7) over the disorder (the strategies) allows us to obtain from (8,9,10,11) expressions for disorder-averaged observables, such as correlation and response functions:
Evaluation of the disorder average
We write (7) in the usual way as an integral over all possible values of the qi(t) and the Aµ(t) at all times, and insert δ-functions to select the solution of (3), followed by averaging over the noise z = {zi(t)}. With the short-hand si(t) = σ[qi(t), zi(t)] we obtain:
The disorder variables appear only in the last line, so
where we introduced the temporary abbreviations
We isolate these as usual by inserting appropriate δ-functions (in integral representation, which generates conjugate integration variables), and define the short-hands DC =
(with similar definitions for the other kernels and functions). Substitution into Z[ψ, φ], followed by re-arranging terms, then leads us to
Upon assuming simple initial conditions of the form p0(q) = i p0(qi) we then arrive at
with
× e
The O(log(N )) term in the exponent of (18) is independent of {ψi(t), φµ(t), θi(t)}, and the external bid Ae(ℓ) and the introduced valuation update function F [A] appear only in Φ.
Saddle-point equations and interpretation of order parameters
The disorder-averaged functional (18) is evaluated by steepest descent integration, leading to coupled equations from which to solve the dynamic order parameters {C,Ĉ, K,K, L,L}:
The notation . . . ⋆ in the above expressions is a short-hand for
Since the bid contribution Ae(t) appears only in Φ, one can take over standard results from the theory of batch MGs with regard to interpretation and simplification of order parameters (see e.g. [8] ). Using the normalization identity lim ψ,φ→0 Z[ψ, φ] = 1 we find
These expressions (28,29,30) are to be evaluated at the physical saddle-point of Ψ + Ω + Φ. We conclude from (29) and (30), in combination with (23,24) that for all (t, t ′ )
We now send the fields {ψi, φµ} to zero, and choose the {θi} to be independent of i. The measure Mi[{q,q, z}] then loses its dependence on i, and equations (22,23,24,25) simplify to
Evaluation of Φ
We turn our attention to the function Φ (20), which, according to (34), we only need to know for small L. We define the matrices 1 I and D, with entries 1 I tt ′ = δ tt ′ and D tt ′ = 1 + C tt ′ , and the short-hands A = {A(t)}, Ae = {Ae(t)} and
This allows us to write
At the saddle-point, G must obey causality, so we can interpret the above expression in terms of an effective stochastic process for the bid, with a zero average Gaussian noise field ξ(t):
The situation is clearly reminiscent of real history MGs [9] , although the equations are simpler. From now on we write averages over (39,40) simply as . . . . We also define
At the saddle-point we have Φ0 = 0. We expand Φ for small L and small φ:
Clearly, lim φ→0,L→0 Φ = Φ0, and Φ0 depends on G only, not on C or L. From our expansion of Φ we can extract all the quantities we are interested in. We only have to be careful that causality can only be assumed after the differentiations:
We define the bid response function R tt ′ = ∂ F [A(t)] /∂Ae(t ′ ) and the bid covariance function
iαΣ tt ′ . Causality ensures that R tt ′ = 0 for t < t ′ , and Rtt = 1. We can also calculate bid statistics:
The effective single agent equation
The above results lead to a further simplification of our saddle-point equations (32,33,34):
We eliminate the {q(t)} by exploiting causality: the term
involves only values of q(t ′ ) with t ′ ≤ t. This allows us to calculate the denominator of the fraction (50) by integrating out the variables {q(t)} iteratively, first over q(tmax) (which gives us δ[q(tmax − 1)]), followed by integration over q(tmax − 1), etc. The result is simply
This, in turn, implies that
We do the remaining integrals over {q}, and write our equations in the simpler form
We recognize that (54) is the measure corresponding to a single-agent process of the form
in which η(t) is a zero-mean Gaussian noise, with temporal correlations η(t)η(t ′ ) = Σ tt ′ . The two kernels Σ and R are to be calculated from
where the averages refer to the process (39,40). The correlation and response functions (12, 13) , the order parameters of our problem, are to be solved from (53), in which . . . ⋆ now denotes averaging over (55) and the zero-average Gaussian noise {z(t)}, with z(t)z(t ′ ) = δ tt ′ . These results represent a fully exact and closed theory for N → ∞.
As a simple test we could go back to the standard MG. If we choose F [A] = A, the effective bid process (39,40) becomes linear, and is solved easily:
so that we can calculate the kernels Σ and R explicitly:
One confirms readily that this is the correct solution.
Ergodic stationary states for A e (t) = A e
We now take Ae(t) = Ae for all t. In time-translation invariant stationary states without long-term memory one has
, and R tt ′ = R(t − t ′ ); all three operators {C, G, Σ} and their powers commute. We try to calculate the four persistent order parameters, χ = t>0 G(t), χ R = t≥0 R(t), c = limt→∞ C(t), and S 2 0 = limt→∞ Σ(t), from the closed equations (53,56). We assume a stationary state without anomalous response, i.e. both χ and χ R are finite numbers. From now on we will use the the following notation for time averages:
x(t). Much of the analysis is standard, and we will where appropriate skip those details that are familiar.
Equations for persistent order parameters -the effective agent process
We defineq = limt→∞ q(t)/t, assuming that this limit exists, and send t → ∞ in the integrated version of (55). The result is
Here σ = limτ→∞ τ 
For the frozen solution we must distinguish between the cases χ R > 0 versus χ R < 0, representing negative versus positive feedback in the effective agent equation:
Here, due to the absence of positive feedback in the system, we can write directly
• χ R < 0:
As was found earlier in other MG versions with positive feedback, the effective agent equation now allows for remanence effects, leading to the potential for multiple solutions: 
The variance of η is simply equal to S 2 0 , since
We can now calculate equations for the persistent order parameters, sending θ → 0 as soon as possible. As before we have to distinguish between χ R > 0 and χ R < 0:
The persistent correlations follow from c = σ
The frozen fraction φ and the susceptibility χ are calculated similarly:
In terms of the usual short-
This situation is simpler: one has c = σ 2 ⋆ = σ 2 (∞), and φ = 1. The susceptibility χ for θ = 0 becomes
If χ R < 0 the system is fully frozen, and nothing further happens. To close our persistent order parameter equations for c and φ if χ R > 0, we need the ratio χ R /S0; to get also χ we need χ R and S0. We now take Ae(t) = Ae, and define the asymptotic time averages
. This allows us to write
Analysis of the effective overall bid process
Closing our stationary state equations requires extracting the values of χ R and S0 from the effective process (39,40) for the overall bids. We separate in the bid noise ξ(t) and the bids A(t) the persistent from the non-persistent terms:
Here z is a zero-average unit-variance frozen Gaussian variable, andξ(t) is also a zero-average Gaussian variable, uncorrelated with z and with covariances ξ (t)ξ(t
Our bid process (39) now becomes
The two quantities A and F are both parametrized by z, so we write A(z) and F (z). Also the non-persistent bid partsÃ(t) depend on z since A occurs in (78), so we writeÃ(t, z). Our static objects S0 and χ R are known once we have F (z). In (77) we have already one relation for the two objects, so we need one more equation connecting A(z) to F (z) to obtain closed formulae. To get this second relation we work out F (z):
So far our analysis is direct and fully exact. What is left is to find the statistics W (a|z) of the non-frozen bid contributions, which requires ansätze. To calculate W (a|z) we assume the response function G to decay much more slowly than the times over which theÃ(t, z) are correlated, so that to the time summation in (78) we can apply the central limit theorem. This tells us that also theÃ(t, z) must be zeroaverage Gaussian. Let us define the covariance matrix Ξ tt ′ (z) = Ã (t, z)Ã(t ′ , z) , it must be time-translation invariant, so we write Ξ(t, z) = Ξs+t,s(z). In Appendix A we show that
If, as in earlier MG analyses [8] , we can rely on limN→∞ τC/τG = 0 in the ergodic regime (this will be our present ansatz) then we have simply Ξ(t, z) =
2C
(t), and in particular Ξ(0, z) = (1 − c), which closes our equations:
with the shorthand Dx = (2π) −1/2 e −x 2 /2 dx. We eliminate A(z) and get F (z) = f (z, Ae), where f (z, Ae) is the solution of the fixed-point equation
The shows that F (z) = Φ(Ae + z 1 2
(1 + c)), where Φ(u) is to be solved from
Clearly Φ(u) is anti-symmetric, since F [A] is anti-symmetric. Finally, we will solve the nonlinear functional equation (83). To do this we define a new function ∆(z) via the identity Φ(u) = [u − ∆ −1 (u)]/χ, insertion into (83) of which gives after some rewriting
Equation (84) is explicit, but shows that in the case of positive feedback (as for the majority game, corresponding to F [A] = −A) there is again the possibility of multiple solutions, which would here take the form of non-invertibility of the function ∆(z). Non-invertibility is signaled by finding ∆ ′ (z) = 0 for finite z, i.e. by
4.3. Equations for χ R and S 0 -closure of the stationary state theory
Given the solution of (83), we obtain closure of our stationary state equations:
When expressing these equations in terms of the function ∆ −1 (z) (which is parametrized by c and χ) we find that both are expressed in terms of the following Gaussian integrals:
We note that the validity of the last step depends crucially on non-invertibility issues being absent or resolved. Substitution of (84) into (86,87), followed by re-arrangements, gives
For Ae = 0 one has I0(c, χ) = 0 and the above integrals simplify. The equations (91,92) are to be solved in combination with (71,73) for c and χ. If this results in χ R > 0, the problem is solved and the observable φ follows from (72). As soon as χ R ≤ 0, we enter the fully frozen state c = φ = 1 induced by positive feedback in the valuation dynamics. From (81) we can also extract an expression for a static overall bid susceptibility χA(z) = ∂A(z)/∂Ae.
Simple model examples
At this stage it is appropriate to inspect specific choices for F [A], to serve as tests. We set Ae = 0 for simplicity; the external bids were needed to calculate the overall bid susceptibility χ R , but are no longer essential.
• F [A] = A, the standard Minority Game:
Here ∆(z) = z(1+χ), so ∆ −1 (z) = z/(1+χ) and the Gaussian integrals I ℓ (c, χ) become
This then reproduces the correct relations
The onset of non-invertibility is according to (85) marked by 1 + χ = 0 (which never happens in the ergodic phase of the standard MG, where χ ≥ 0). Since always χ R > 0 we never enter the fully frozen (remanent) state obtained via the Maxwell construction.
• F [A] = −A, the standard Majority Game:
The result for χ R and S0 is
If χ R > 0 (no remanence) one extracts from (73) and (96) 
, so for α < 1 we can be sure that χ < 0 and run into the contradiction χ R < 0. Apparently, the general scenario is that where χ R < 0 and the system is in the fully frozen remanent state. Hence χ < 1, and its value is given by formula (74), which reduces to
The condition for leaving the frozen remanent state, viz. χ = 1, is seen to coincide with the condition for having non-invertibility for the overall bid process, but this condition will clearly never be met; the system is always in the fully frozen remanent state.
Applications -greedy versus cautious contrarians
We now apply our theory to specific choices for the function F [A], all corresponding to models that so far could only be studied via numerical simulations. For simplicity we choose Ae = 0.
Preparation
Due to Ae = 0, the equations (91,92) that close our equations for persistent order parameters simplify to
and with ∆(z) as given in (84). It will prove efficient to define the function
Combining our relations so far then allows us to conclude that ergodic solutions with χ R > 0 follow from solving the following two coupled equations for the basic unknowns (v, χ), after which the order parameters φ and c follow via φ = 1 − Erf(v) and c = c(v) (so always v ≥ 0):
Only χ > 0 is possible, so we are allowed to introduce a further function U (v) ≥ 0,
and compactify our equations for (v, χ), describing solutions with χ > 0 and χ R > 0, to
One proves from the definitions of I1,2(c, χ) that always
, so the numerator of the first of our compact equations is always nonnegative. To have a solution with χ R > 0 we must demand that the denominator is also positive. In contrast, in states with χ R < 0 one has c = σ 2 (∞), φ = 1 i.e. the system is always fully frozen. Here the only order parameter left to be calculated is χ, which follows from
Again only χ > 0 is possible (which we may rely upon in the rest of this paper), hence
To confirm that indeed χ R < 0 we must verify the outcome of
Invertible overall bid impact functions
Here we focus on those models, which includes the original MG, in which F [A] is monotonically increasing. The ansatz χ > 0 now guarantees that ∆(z) is invertible. These models have a remarkable universality property: all exhibit an ergodicity-breaking transition, marked by χ → ∞, exactly at the value αc of the standard minority game, irrespective of the precise form of the function F [A]. To demonstrate this we first rewrite (84):
From this we conclude that, for all z ∈ IR,
Since F [A] is monotonic, the obvious solution ∆ −1 (z) = 0 (guaranteed by the anti-symmetry of F [A]) must be unique, and hence we know that generally limχ→∞ ∆ −1 (z) = 0. It now follows that limχ→∞ I1(c, χ) = limχ→∞ I2(c, χ) = 0, and therefore via (98,99) we find Empty/full markers correspond to biased/unbiased initial conditions. As observed for the volatility, also φ and c appear to be only weakly dependent on γ in the ergodic region α < αc.
The ansatz χ > 0 guarantees sgn(χ R ) = 1 (with χ R ↓ 0 as χ → ∞), and our persistent order parameter equations (71,72,73) close at the transition χ → ∞ exactly in the same way as they would for the conventional MG, i.e. Away from the transition one should expect a dependence of the values of the persistent order parameters on the choice made for F [A]. However, for 'sensible' choices of F [A] one generally finds this dependence to be weak. To illustrate this we now focus on a particular class of models, with monotonic valuation update functions of the form
These models are relatively straightforward generalizations of the original MG (which corresponds to γ = 1), nevertheless for γ = 1 the standard solution route (i.e. generating functional analysis of the strategy selection process, without including the overall bid dynamics explicitly in the formalism), would not have worked. For γ > 1 the agents with (114) place more importance on making money by exploiting large fluctuations (|A| > 1), so can be described as greedy high-risk contrarians, whereas for γ < 1 they prefer to exploit small market fluctuations, and operate as cautious low-risk contrarians. We know from the above argument that their χ → ∞ ergodicity breaking transition point αc will be identical to that of the standard MG. Let us now calculate the persistent order parameters in the ergodic region α > αc. On physical grounds one does not expect a negative susceptibility and F [A] increases monotonically, hence ∆(z) will be invertible, and we can transform the integrals (100) via the substitution z = ∆(x) √ 2/ √ 1 + c, and find
This removes the need for inversion of ∆(z). For the models (114) one then finds For non-integer γ the integral has to be calculated numerically. For integer γ one finds
Since on physical grounds one does not expect a negative susceptibility, invertibility is expected to hold and the present family of models should behave qualitatively as the ordinary MG. One also expects that as the susceptibility goes to zero for large alpha the behavior of the system should be almost independent of the value of γ. For γ ≤ 3 these predictions are borne out by numerical simulations (all carried out with N = 4097, and measured during 1000 steps after an 2000 steps equilibration period), as shown in figures 1-4. For large γ (excessive agent greed), however, in spite of the agents still operating as contrarians, the ergodic phase appears to be destroyed by their increasing focus on big-gain big-risk decisions, and there is no longer an efficient market regime with low volatility.
Applications -dynamic switching between contrarian trading and trend following
Next we inspect a class of models in which agents switch from trend-following to contrarian behaviour, dependent on the absolute value |A| of the overall market bid. The rationale is to create more realistic agent behaviour, based on interpreting A as a measure of the price returns in the market. One example was proposed in [11] , corresponding to F [A] = ǫA 3 − A, with ǫ > 0. This model, in which agents are trend-follows for |A| < 1/ √ ǫ but contrarians for |A| > 1/ √ ǫ, can not be solved analytically using the standard generating functional analysis route. Here we generalize their model slightly, allowing also for the reverse tendency, where agents become trend-followers for large instead of small |A|, and analyze the case
The model of [11] corresponds to τ = −1 and A0 = 1/ √ ǫ. For τ = 1, in contrast, agents behave as contrarians for modest deviations of the returns from their average value, but switch to herding when they perceive the market to be anomalous, i.e. for |A| > A0. For A0 → ∞, the model (122) reduces either to the standard MG (for τ = 1) or to a majority type game (for τ = −1); for A0 → 0 one anticipates the opposite.
Non-invertible overall bid impact functions
For (122) one finds
(1−c), there will always be a region of non-invertibility, with three solutions z of the equation ∆(z) = ∆. The latter are the roots of a cubic equation and can therefore be calculated analytically,
Following [13] we write the cubic equation in the form z 3 + 3qz − 2r = 0 by defining
We can then classify the solution(s) of the equation ∆(z) = ∆ as follows: Our solution must respect the symmetry ∆ −1 (−z) = −∆ −1 (z), which translates into searching for a root with z(−r) = −z(r). Inspection reveals that for q 3 + r 2 > 0 the solution (126) has the desired symmetry. For q 3 + r 2 < 0 we find that z2(−r) = −z2(r), and that z3(−r) = −z1(r). Hence z1,3(r) represent two 'extremal' solution branches (related to each other by inversion symmetry), and z2(r) represents a middle branch. The region of multiple solutions is defined by |r| < |q| 3/2 , where we have infinitely many options for assigning a value to ∆ −1 (z). The conventional one is the Maxwell construction, based on assuming the multiplicity of solutions to be caused by remanence. Here the middle branch z2(r) is taken to be dynamically unstable, and one takes for 0 < r < |q| of the r > |q| 3/2 solution, and for −|q| 3/2 < r < 0 the continuation z3(r) of the r < −|q|
solution, with a discontinuity at r = 0. Our second option implies assuming the middle branch to be stable, i.e. choosing z2(r) for |r| < |q| 3/2 . The two options are illustrated in figure 5 . Assessing which of these choices (if any) is correct would in principle require a stability analysis of the asymptotic solution of the overall bid dynamics.
Upon translating the above arguments into the language of ∆ −1 (z), the resulting picture is the following, where still q = 
Here ∆(z) is fully invertible. In the alternative scenario we have the Maxwell option:
But we also have the non-Maxwell solution, which can be rewritten as:
Only for A0 → ∞ can we decide between our candidate solutions for q < 0 and |r(z)| < |q|
without analyzing dynamic stability in the underlying bid process. There (122) reduces to the standard MG for τ = 1 and to the standard majority game for τ = −1, both of which we analyzed in section 4.4. The correct solution must reproduce limA 0 →∞ ∆ −1 (z) = z/(1 +χ). For A0 → ∞,χ / ∈ (−1, 0), and finite z one has q < 0 and |r(z)| < |q| 3/2 (in fact limA 0 →∞ r(z)/|q| 3/2 = 0), so we do indeed probe the region of ambiguity. Our test reveals, using √ 3 sin ( 1 3 arccos(x)) − cos ( 1 3 arccos(x)) = − 2 3
x + O(x 3 ), that for A0 → ∞:
Maxwell soln :
alternative soln :
Forχ ∈ (−1, 0) we have q > 0, so there is no ambiguity: ∆ −1 (z) is given by (130), which for A0 → ∞ reproduces correctly ∆ −1 (z) = z/(1 +χ) + O(A −1 0 ). Hence, for A0 → ∞ the only acceptable solution is (130,132) ‡. We resolve the remaining ambiguity as follows: since the pure majority and minority games always exhibit limz→0
we take this property to hold generally. This means that for weak random bids the effect of agent interaction is to push these bids back to zero (contrarian action) or to amplify them (trend-following), but there is no change of sign. For τ = −1 we now have either 
Conventional χ → ∞ transitions
We can now calculate transition lines. In the present model we can have a traditional χ → ∞ transition, a transition where χ R changes sign (switching from a minority to a majority-type game), and a transition marking the emergence of jumps in ∆ −1 (z). We start with the calculation of the χ → ∞ transitions.
For τ = 1, χ → ∞ and finite z one has r(z) = O(χ −1 ) and q = 
From this one extracts limχ→∞ I1(c, χ) = limχ→∞ I2(c, χ) = 0, and via the same arguments that applied to models with invertible bid impact functions one is led to 
(1−c) we return as expected to the conventional MG transition line at αc ≈ 0.3374; however, in contrast to τ = 1 this line is now in the non-remanent region. If A (1−c), on the other hand, the χ → ∞ line will be in the remanent region. With some foresight we now write A 
which leads to
Upon solving the first equation for Ξ,
(141) ‡ It is surprising that in this problem the Maxwell construction is not always the correct way to handle the multiplicity of solutions, given its track record in physical many-particle systems. However, minority games do not obey detailed balance, so intuition developed on the basis of bifurcation analyses obtained via free energy minimization in equilibrium systems may be misleading.
we then arrive at a convenient parametrization of the transition line in the (α, A0) plane, with v ≥ 0 as a parameter. The line turns out to have two branches (indicated by ±): (1 − c) (in the non-remanent region, where it is independent of A0), and for π(1+c), the bid susceptibility χ R goes through zero, marking a switch to majority game behavior; we find below that this occurs for the + branch at v = 0.
To aid and test numerical evaluation it will be helpful to assess the limits v → 0 and v → ∞ of the above parametrized branches. For small v one finds, using Erf(
] and the fact that Ξ(v) cannot be negative,
Hence 
6.3. Onset of remanence-induced discontinuities in the χ R > 0 region
It is clear that discontinuities emerge in our equations as soon as q ≤ 0. Even if it is not yet clear which precise observables will be affected by these discontinuities, it implies that there exists an alternative transition marked by the condition q = 0, i.e. by
When (149) holds, we find upon expanding for small q that limq→0 ∆ −1 (z) = −(A 2 0 z/χ) 1/3 , and so along the line (149) the integrals (100) reduce to gamma functions:
Dz |z|
This leads to 
Again, after combination with the q = 0 condition, we thereby arrive at a parametrization of the transition line in the (α, A0) plane, with v ≥ 0 as a parameter, with two ± branches:
The corresponding value of χ then follows from
5441. Secondly, to have A0 ∈ IR and α > 0 we must demand, respectively, Ξ±(v) ≤ [
). The third condition is χ ≥ 0, which translates into: Ξ±(v) ≥ 0 for τ = 1, and Ξ±(v) ≤ 0 for τ = −1. The second and third conditions can be combined into
For small v we may use expansion (144), which tells us that U (v) diverges at v = 0, to find
√ πΓ(
Hence
For σ[∞] = 0 (i.e. no decision noise) this result gives limv→0 α−(v) = Γ 2 (
)/π[18 √ πΓ(
) ≈ 1.3204. For the '+ ′ branch the limit v → 0 does not exist; instead when v is decreased the line terminates at the value vmin such that A + 0 (vmin) = 0. Finally, the two branches terminate and meet at the value vmax
), i.e. where
(note: via the relation Γ(z)Γ(1 − z) = π/ sin(πz) one could simplify our expressions further).
The χ R = 0 transition lines
We saw earlier that χ R can change sign at the χ = ∞ line. Here we inspect the possibility of having a χ R = 0 transition for finite χ and finite α. The effective agent equation (60) would now giveq = η √ α + θ, leading to c = σ 2 [∞] and φ = 1. The susceptibility would become
The χ R transition line is hence to be solved from the following coupled equations for (χ, α, A0):
One can use χ > 0 as a parameter, solve the first equation for A0(χ), and then calculate α(χ) via the second. For σ(∞) = 1 (no decision noise) the two equations simplify further to
We will explore this latter case, where ∆(z) = z(1 + τ χ) − z 3 /A If τ = 1 we have q = − 1 3
; here we must in the remanent regime always select the non-Maxwell option (132). We replace χ as a parameter by λ = 2|q| 3/2 /(3|q| − A 2 0 ) ≥ 0. This implies that r(z)/|q| 3/2 = −z/λ, and hence
The first equation of (166) then gives |q| = [ Dz |z|Ω(|z|/λ)] −1 , and we obtain the following explicit parametrization of the χ R = 0 line:
Let us determine the extremal points. For λ → ∞ we use Ω(x) = 2 3
x + 8 81
For small λ we note that the χ R = 0 line terminates at the value λc where A0 ceases to be real-valued. This value λc is the solution of 3 2 λ Dz |z|Ω(|z|/λ) = 1
and corresponds to the following point in the (α, A0) plane:
If τ = −1 we have q = − 
(175)
Again we find the first equation of (166) giving |q| = [ Dz |z|Ω(|z|/λ)] −1 , but now our parametrization becomes 
Solid lines: χ = ∞ transition, dashed lines: remanence onset transition, dotted lines: χ R = 0 (minority-to-majority) transition. The MinGame phase is characterized by χ R > 0 (contrarian trading), the MajGame phase by χ R < 0 (trend-following). R indicates remanence. In the left picture (τ = −1, giving trend-following for |A| < A 0 and contrarian trading for |A| > A 0 ), the phase diagram is reasonably complete and reliable. For small A 0 we have only the MinGame phase, with the standard χ → ∞ transition at αc ≈ 0.3374. As A 0 is increased a small remanent region is formed, until we switch to a MajGame state for large A 0 . In the right picture (τ = 1, giving contrarian trading for |A| < A 0 and trend-following for |A| > A 0 ), we find the MinGame phase, with the standard χ → ∞ transition at αc ≈ 0.3374, for large A 0 (as expected). However, the overall picture is now more uncertain since most of the diagram is remanent. Since we can never be sure of picking the right solution in the remanent phase, the location of the χ R = 0 line cannot be taken as certain, and indeed intuition suggests that it should have connected to the point where the χ = ∞ and the remanence onset lines meet. In both diagrams we cannot draw the line separating the non-ergodic MinGame phase from the MajGame phase for small α; as this line involves nonergodic phases, we have no access to it with a theory that assumes ergodicity.
In the limit λ → ∞ we use the expansions Ω(x) = 2 3 x − 8 81
for q > 0, and
The latter point coincides with the termination point of the χ → ∞ transition line for τ = −1. The χ R = 0 line for τ = −1 can only have a finite λ termination point with A0 = 0 if q > 0, i.e. in the remanent region. In practice we find no such points for τ = −1, irrespective of q.
Phase diagrams
We can now summarize the picture obtained by analyzing time-translation invariant states in terms of a phase diagram. The control parameters are α ≥ 0, A0 ≥ 0 and τ = ±1. We have so far identified three transition types: χ → ∞, χ R → 0 and q → 0. The result is shown in figure 6 , and discussed in detail in the corresponding figure caption. Most of the technical subtleties in the present models are generated by remanence, so the phase diagram for τ = −1 (giving the model of [11] ) is the most complete and reliable, since the remanent region is relatively contained. The situation is different for τ = 1, where most of the phase diagram is remanent, and consequently we cannot be certain of the location of the χ R = 0 line. A proper resolution here would require going beyond the asymptotic limit of the effective agent and the effective overall bid processes, in order to determine dynamic stability and dependence on initial conditions of the values of the persistent order parameters.
Simulations
We have tested our predictions for the values of persistent order parameters and the locations of phase transition lines, for the models (122) and for both values of τ . All simulations were carried out without decision noise, for systems of size N = 4097 and for both unbiased (qi(0) = ±10 −4 ) and biased (qi(0) = ±1) random initializations. Observables were measured during 1000 batch steps, following an equilibration stage of 2000 batch steps.
We begin with τ = −1 (the model of [11] ). In figure 7 we present results for the volatility σ, the persistent correlations c, and the fraction of frozen agents φ, for values of A reproduce a majority-game type state for large A0 (top row), but as A0 is reduced (middle and bottom rows) the system exhibits behaviour that is less clear-cut than what is suggested by the phase diagram. We are still in the non-remanent region, so this cannot be explained by remanence effects. Close to the remanent region R of the τ = −1 phase diagram, the simulations are in rough agreement with the predictions, see figure 8 . The vertical dashed line marks the χ = ∞ transition, and seems to agree with simulations within the finite size limitations. In figure 9 we probe the region where we expect MG-type behaviour. This is borne out in the ergodic region, for α > αc (and the transition is found in the right place, in agreement with the phase diagram). However, for α < αc the behaviour is found to be far from typical; in contrast to the standard MG, the differences between the biased and unbiased initial conditions are small, and more likely to result of instabilities than long-term memory. In fact one notes similarities in behavior with figure 4 for ≤ 0.5, which differs from the prediction in the phase diagram. Furthermore, one notes instabilities of multiplicities of states in the remanent regime, to the right of the χ = ∞ transition. These deviations for τ = 1 are of course not unexpected, since the τ = 1 phase diagram is plagued by remanence. They could be caused by many things, possibly in combination: incorrect selection of mathematical solutions in the remanent phase, insufficiently equilibrated simulations made worse by remanence, alternative transitions (e.g. onset of weak long-term memory), etc. 
Discussion
Minority-game type models have an amazing ability to describe new phenomena within an accessible mathematical framework, and to throw up new mathematical surprises and puzzles. In this paper we have studied generalized agent-based market models of the MG-type (in their so-called 'fake history' batch version), in which the agents' strategy valuation update rule is allowed to depend on the overall market bid, via an impact function F [A] (which would be F [A] = ±A for the standard minority and majority games, respectively). The function F [A] allows us to model the effect of agents' interpretation of the state of the market (the magnitude of the fluctuations), assuming that whether price fluctuations are perceived to be large or small should somehow influence how agents trade in financial markets. Our motive is to incorporate into solvable market models such behavioral elements. In this study we focus on two model classes: one in which agents are always contrarians, but where we can control their greed and willingness to take risks, viz. At a mathematical level, the generating functional analysis of the present class of models requires studying the overall bid evolution explicitly, similar to how one would study models with real market history. It turns out that a key issue in working towards closed self consistent equations for persistent order parameters is whether the overall bid process is remanent. In non-remanent cases, such as F [A] = sgn(A)|A| γ , solution is direct and relatively easy, and the agreement between theory and simulations is excellent (for this particular model: unless γ becomes too large, where we lose the ergodic phase altogether). In remanent cases, such as ] with τ = ±1, we need to rely on ansätze and Maxwell-type approximations to select a solution from the possible stationary states, especially for τ = 1, and the agreement between theory and experiment is consequently limited.
Once more, what appear at first sight to be simple modifications of the standard MG lead to highly nontrivial and unexpected behaviour (even in batch models with fake histories). As soon as agents are allowed to adapt their trading style to the magnitude of the fluctuations, in the spirit of [11] , one introduces a non-trivial effective overall bid process, with new instabilities and new transitions. We are now approaching the point where theories based on persistent order parameter equations only, the ones that benefit most from the simplifications induced by having 'frozen agents', are no longer giving us the information we need. In models dominated by remanence, which are the type one needs when including more realistic agent behaviour, we can no longer avoid solving the full dynamics more explicitly.
where S1(t − t ′ ) = Ξ(0, z)+Ξ(t−t ′ , z), S2(t − t ′ ) = Ξ(0, z)−Ξ(t−t ′ , z). In particular we need the two quantities At this point we inspect how various terms scale. We know from earlier MG work (especially from approximate calculations of the volatility, see e.g. [8] ) that the relaxation of the response function G is very slow. Upon making an ansatz of the form G(t) = χ(e µ − 1)e −µt one can show that in the stationary state one must put µ → 0 (the relaxation time seems to diverge with N in an as yet undetermined way). For such an exponential ansatz one would find s>0 G(s)G(s − t) = χ 2 e −µ|t| (e µ − 1)/(e µ + 1) = O(µχ 2 ). Thus if µ → 0 the second term in (A.7) vanishes in the ergodic regime. In the final term we use our earlier ansatz that the correlations Ξ(s) decay on short times; formula (A.7) suggests that this relaxation time will be that ofC(t). If this relaxation time is τC, we may estimate the scaling of the last term in (A.7) as O(µτC χ 2 ). So, upon writing the relaxation time of the response function as τG, we may replace µ → 1/τG and write (A.7) as
O(τC/τG) (A.8)
